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Abstract 
According to Principal-Agent theory, states (the principal) delegate the implementation of a 
legalized agreement to an international organization (the agent). The conventional wisdom 
about states’ capacity to control international organizations is that differences among the 
member states impede control and consequently enhance the agent’s autonomy, whereas 
agreement allows for effective control and limited autonomy. Contrary to this conventional 
wisdom, this article argues that conflicts among states need not impede effective control. On 
the contrary: it harbors gains from the exchange of informal control over an organization’s 
divisions. As a result, international organizations exhibit informal spheres of influence, or 
national chiefdoms. The article demonstrated the theory’s plausibility using the example of 
the EU. It has implications for the literature on delegation and informal governance. 
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Trading Control: National Chiefdoms 
within International Organizations 
 
Introduction 
According to the treaties, members of the European Commission, the 
European Union’s (EU) principal supranational bureaucracy, are entirely 
independent in their decisions and take instructions neither from their native 
country, parties, nor from any other group. Brussels’ folk wisdom 
consequently regards the Commission as a counterbalance to member states’ 
reactionary reflexes that, in the words of an early theorist of European 
integration, serves to upgrade states’ common interests (Haas 1961, 369). In 
reality, however, nationality seems to play a strong role in the Commission, 
even if the treaty says otherwise. This became most obvious when the 
looming accession of new member states to the EU led to calls to reduce the 
Commission’s size by relinquishing the member states’ right to nominate a 
Commissioner. Although they typically argue in favor of the Commission’s 
independence, especially small member states insisted fiercely on retaining 
“their” Commissioner. The phenomenon is not limited to the EU. As I shall 
illustrate, there appears to be substantial variation in the extent to which 
international bureaucracies exhibit national chiefdoms, that is, subdivisions 
within an international bureaucracy that unofficially “belong” to and are 
influenced by a certain country.  
Although empirical studies sometimes mention the existence of chiefdoms or 
different cultures within international organizations (Cini 2000), this 
phenomenon is not easily squared with the way that International Relations 
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scholars typically approach international organizations. According to the 
popular Principal-Agent model, states delegate the authority to implement a 
legalized interstate agreement to an international bureaucracy. Anticipating 
that they will be tempted to manipulate their agent, states deliberately shield 
it from ad-hoc influence. Thus, the act of delegation reifies member states and 
the international organization as two unitary actors in a principal-agent 
relationship. Although states set up control mechanisms in order to keep their 
organization in check, this model does not envisage national influence from 
inside a bureaucracy. That would be considered an institutional pathology. 
There are good arguments for neglecting the study of informal spheres of 
national influence within international organizations. One is that political 
posts within a bureaucracy are largely ceremonial. Just like the Department of 
Administrative Affairs in the British television series “Yes Minister” is in fact 
run by civil servants, and not by the minister, it is possible that political posts 
within the Commission or other bureaucracies are prestigious, but 
unimportant. Another argument against studying national chiefdoms is that 
certain subdivisions belong to certain countries simply because they have 
more expertise. Landlocked Austria, for example, might face difficulties 
coming up with a candidate for the head of the fisheries division. In contrast, I 
contend that informal spheres of influence are neither pathologies nor 
insignificant. They arise systematically and are important for understanding 
how international organizations work day to day. 
This article presents a transaction-cost based theory of informal spheres of 
influence in international organizations. Its central argument is that these 
spheres result from the implicit exchange of administrative control among 
governments. Drawing on distributional theories of Congress (Weingast and 
Marshall 1988), it is based on the assumption that the diversity of interests 
among states holds gains from the exchange of influence over different 
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dimensions of an organization’s output. Because governments may renege on 
delivering their quid pro quo, states enforce these exchanges by granting one 
another agenda control over their preferred divisions within the international 
organization – a control that they can use to prevent activism and determine 
the content of the division’s policy. As a result, international organizations 
exhibit mutually tolerated informal spheres of national influence, or national 
chiefdoms. A testable implication of this theory is that because member states 
grant one another agenda control over their most preferred subdivisions, 
preference outliers with strong interests in the subdivision’s policy control 
national chiefdoms. 
The theory has important implications for the literature on delegation and 
international organization. First, the paper offers a theoretical argument about 
the limits of Principal-Agent approaches to organizations. If durable 
exchanges of control among states result in the institutionalization of national 
chiefdoms within an administration, this administration (agent) cannot be 
considered a unitary actor in interaction with the member states (principal). 
Although the approach itself is relatively theory-neutral in the sense that it 
does not assume actors to hold specific preferences over policies, international 
relations scholars typically assume that international organizations have a 
preference for enhancing their autonomy vis-à-vis member states (Hawkins, 
Lake, Nielson et al. 2006, 9-10, 24-25), and consequently ask whether and how 
states keep them under control (e.g., Pollack 1997). Similarly, in EU studies 
prominent models of legislative bargaining typically model the Commission 
as a unitary actor with invariably strong preferences for deep levels of 
integration (see, e.g., Garrett and Tsebelis 1996, 280). I argue that its unitary 
character and preferences are empirical questions that cannot be imputed to 
an international organization. Politics and bureaucracy interact in more 
complex ways.  
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Second, the paper contributes to a growing body of literature on informal 
governance within international organizations. Prominent studies in this 
research agenda attribute this phenomenon to power asymmetries among 
member states (Stone 2011, ; see, however, Author b), arguing that informal 
governance allows powerful states to circumvent the formal procedures when 
they consider their important interests to be at stake. In contrast, this paper 
presents a transaction cost-based argument for the existence of informal 
governance, which it attributes to implicit exchange of control within an 
international organization. 
To demonstrate the theory’s plausibility, this article presents a case study of 
appointments and recruitments in the European Commission and a cursory 
description of practices in other international organizations. Drawing on new 
material from EU archives and other primary sources about the member 
states’ informal influence as well as secondary analyses of its preferences and 
appointments, I find that this supranational bureaucracy indeed exhibits 
divisions that are informally dominated by one or a group of like-minded 
member states. Corroborating the theory, member states informally grant one 
another control over those divisions that they prefer intensely. 
The article is structured as follows. The following section briefly reviews how 
today’s literature on international organization has come to approach 
organizations as unitary actors and consequently neglect the politics within 
them. The second section then presents a theoretical argument for why and 
under what circumstances we should expect international organizations to 
exhibit informal spheres of national influence. Using the example of college of 
Commissioners and their cabinets in the EU, the subsequent section probes 
the theory’s plausibility. I conclude by discussing the applicability of this 
theory beyond the case of the EU, illustrating the existence of informal 
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spheres of influence in other international organizations, and recapitulating 
the study’s theoretical and substantive implications. 
 
The Politics of and within International Organizations 
International organizations can be defined as formal entities that have states 
as members and possess a permanent secretariat, bureaucracy or some other 
form of permanent administration  (Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke 
2004, 103). Although they are constitutive for international organizations, 
administrations have received less and less attention as scholarly focus shifted 
from the politics within to the politics and design of international 
organizations. Ironically, the principal-agent approach, which places 
emphasis on the “actorness” of international organization, contributed to the 
scholarly neglect of organizations. Only recently, the literature on informal 
governance with its focus on uncodified rules that run in parallel to official 
procedures has begun to explore the complex interaction between the politics 
of and within international organizations. The following is a brief overview of 
the shift in scholarly attention away from organizations and the renewed 
interests in studies of informal governance. 
In the post-war era, it was a central concern for scholars to explore whether 
the new international organizations such as the World Bank or the United 
Nations would be able to support the political and economic reconstruction 
effort. Against the background of the intellectual divide between “idealists” 
and “realists,” who were optimistic or pessimistic in this respect, the focus of 
research typically lay on the politics within international organizations to 
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identify the conditions under which these organizations triumphed over 
nation states’ realpolitikal reflex.1  
With the deepening of international interdependence in the 1970s, scholars 
realized that many situations in international politics are characterized not by 
discord or harmony, but by a combination of mutual dependence and conflict 
(“mixed motives”). Accordingly, attention shifted to the conditions under 
which states want to cooperate and accept being constrained by a regime’s 
“norms, principles, rules and procedures.”2 This new focus gradually 
demoted the study of international organizations proper. “Prior to the study 
of international regimes,” Lisa Martin and Beth Simmons explain in their 
review of the intellectual history of international organization, “an inquiry 
into the effects of international institutions meant inquiring into how 
effectively a particular agency performed its job… When regime analysts 
looked for effects, these were understood to be outcomes influenced by a 
constellation of rules rather than tasks performed by a collective international 
agency” (Martin and Simmons 1998, 737). 
International organizations resumed center stage when instead of falling 
apart, as some scholars had predicted, they became increasingly prominent as 
the end of the East-West conflict opened up new opportunities to shape the 
global order. However, their proliferation and increasing significance from 
the 1990s onwards also raised concerns among some scholars and general 
public about the accountability of international organizations. Since these 
discussions resembled debates in American Politics about the autonomy of 
                                                        
1 For example, Ernst Haas’ ((1958)) neo-functionalist approach to international integration was 
inter alia based on the conviction that actors within supranational organizations would persuade 
national elites to shift their loyalty from the domestic to the supranational level. This stands in 
contrast to Morgenthau’s contention that realpolitik is central  
2 This research question allowed scholars to link the discipline to the analysis of institutions in 
other disciplines. Robert Axelrod ((1984)), for example, introduced game theory to the study of 
cooperation, and Bob Keohane ((Keohane 1984)) applied transaction cost economics to the study 
of international regimes. 
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“runaway” bureaucracies, it was not long until scholars introduced principal-
agent (P-A) approaches to the study of international organizations. From this 
perspective, states (the collective principal) delegate the authority to 
implement a legalized interstate agreement to an international bureaucracy 
(the agent), and then devise a number of control mechanisms in order to keep 
the agent in check.3 As the following section points out, because it views 
agents as unitary actors, the principal-agent approach shifted its attention to 
the interaction between international organizations and its members at the 
expense of the interaction within the organization itself.  
Only recently, the research program on informal governance has begun to 
explore the complex interaction between interests and organizations in its 
day-to-day operation. Stone presents a power-based theory of informal 
governance, arguing that it is the result of a tacit deal between small states 
and the US concerning the organization’s autonomy. In exchange for more 
favorable formal voting rights in normal times, small states accept that the 
dominant power assumes informal temporary control of the organization 
when urgent strategic objectives override its interest in the organization’s 
long-term interests (Stone 2011). Kleine argues that in more symmetric 
settings such as the European Union (EU), states informal governance in 
order to prevent otherwise autonomous supranational agents from adopting 
measures that provoke unmanageable domestic pressure against this 
organization. It thus gives them the flexibility to manipulate one another’s 
domestic politics of collective action in a way that domestic interests remain 
constantly aligned in favor of cooperation (Kleine forthcoming-a, 
forthcoming-b).  
                                                        
3 Applying this approach to the study of EU institutions, Mark Pollack ((1997, 129)) argued that 
supranational actors’ autonomy critically depended on the effectiveness of institutional control 
mechanisms. A volume edited by Hawkins and colleagues ((2006)) applied the P-A model and 
some of its extensions to the study of international organizations such as the IMF or the WTO. 
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In short, studies of the politics within international bureaucracies. This 
research agenda goes beyond standard P-A approaches in that it explores 
under what conditions international organizations can in fact be considered 
autonomous agents. In this respect, however, they have only scratched the 
surface. 
 
A Theory of Informal Spheres of National Influence 
within International Organizations 
Why do governments tolerate one another’s informal influence over aspects 
of an international organization? This section presents a transaction cost-
based theory of national chiefdoms within international organizations. It 
starts off with the observation of standard P-A models that conflicts among 
the member states impedes effective state control and enhances the autonomy 
of international organization, whereas agreement among states on how they 
want the international organization to act reduces its room for maneuver. 
Extending this model by allowing for the international organization to 
comprise multiple issue-areas turns these claims on their head, since multiple 
issues open up opportunities for gains from exchange of states’ support for 
control. Because deals like this are subject to the problem of ex post 
opportunism, it is argued that states institutionalize the non-market exchange 
of control by granting one another informal spheres of national influence over 
subdivisions within the international organization.  
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The limits of control of international organizations 
As described in the previous section, it has become popular to analyze the 
strategic interaction between states and international organizations through 
the lens of Principal-Agent theory. In this model, a boss (or principal) 
delegates certain tasks to a subordinate (or agent), who can either act in a way 
that is good for the boss or shirk in one way or another. The delegation of 
authority is consequently fraught with problems. For example, the principal 
might choose the wrong candidate for the job, someone who is more 
interested in checking facebook than in getting on with the job. Another 
problem arises when, once the contract is signed, the agent acquires superior 
information that she might use against the boss’ best interests.4 
This division of labor also makes sense in the international arena. States (the 
principal) delegate authority to an international organization (the agent) in 
order to interpret ambiguous rules, to take the blame for unpopular policies, 
or to centralize policy-relevant expertise (Hawkins, Lake, Nielson et al. 2006, 
13-20). Yet the delegation of authority in international politics is fraught with 
similar delegation problems as in the workplace. Once set up, the 
international organization’s staff or leadership might develop different views 
about what it should do and how, and it consequently exploits its autonomy 
against the member states’ best interests (agency slack).  
Since states may anticipate these delegation problems, this is not where the 
story ends. There is wide agreement that states limit the risk of shirking by 
designing mechanisms that align incentives and reduce informational 
asymmetries between both parties. Scholars typically distinguish between 
police patrol and fire alarm control mechanisms (McCubbins and Schwartz 
1984). For example, the explication and mandatory approval of work 
                                                        
4 Bendor et al. ((2001)) provide a good overview of theories of delegation in political science. 
Stone ((2009)) critically discusses the literature on delegation in international politics. 
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programs is a police-patrol type control mechanism that takes effect prior to 
the agent’s action. Interest groups that detect and report fraud are fire-alarm 
type mechanisms that go off when the agent is about to shirk, and that 
provide states the opportunity to punish and recontract their agent. Thus, the 
autonomy of international organizations is, in fact, an empirical question that 
depends on the design of control mechanisms and the credibility of states’ 
threat to invoke them (Pollack 1997, 129). 
Some scholars maintain that the control of agents is particularly difficult in 
the international realm, since international organizations are accountable not 
to a single, but to a collective principal consisting of two or more states. As a 
consequence, the credibility of the principal’s threat to invoke control 
mechanisms to change the international organization’s action depends on the 
members’ capacity to take collective decisions. This specific characteristic, 
some argue, potentially gives international organizations substantial 
autonomy. As Daniel Nielson and Mike Tierney (2003, 249) express it: 
If actors within the collective principal do not agree on 
proposed policy changes or institutional reforms, and the 
agent is cognizant of this disagreement, then the agent may be 
able to play members of the collective principal against each 
other. Such a situation makes it difficult for the collective 
principal to alter, or credibly threaten to alter, the agent’s 
contract. Hence, agents can more easily ignore threats and 
refuse to modify their behavior.5 
This holds true even when majority voting facilitates decision-making. Lisa 
Martin (2006, 144) observes:  
When state preferences diverge, stretching along the entire 
policy continuum, there is more likely to be a wide range of 
proposals that could gain majority approval. This gives the staff 
[the of an international organization] room for maneuver, as they 
can choose the proposal within this space that comes closest to 
their ideal point. 
                                                        
5  Cf. Fritz Scharpf ((1988)) makes a similar argument, which he refers to as the “joint decision 
trap.”  
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In other words, the literature on delegation in international politics 
emphasizes that substantial differences in states’ interests impede effective 
control of international organizations and, ceteris paribus, enhances the 
organization’s autonomy vis-à-vis its members, the collective principal. 
 
Gains from exchange of control 
The finding that diverse preferences among the members of a collective 
principal impede effective control of an agent stands in contrast to results in 
political economy about the gains from political exchange. This work on vote 
trading, also known as logrolling, stipulates that divergent interests create 
implicit or explicit markets for the trading of political support (Buchanan and 
Tullock 1962; Tullock 1981).  
The central difference between both models is the multidimensionality of 
policies. Consider a legislature deliberating on a single issue. Absent any 
contact, each legislator submits a proposal that benefits him at the expense of 
others, but none of these proposals commands a majority. However, by 
supporting an issue that our legislator cares less about in exchange for 
support on another issue that is closer to his heart, all legislators get their 
proposal passed and, as a result, are better off. 
This formal result about the gains from political exchange implies that 
divergent preferences among the members of a collective principal need not 
impede the control of an agent. In fact, the divergence of preferences creates 
potential gains from exchange of political support for the control of an 
international organization. Consider the following hypothetical situation 
where state A opposes the organization’s liberalization of public companies, 
while state B faces a similar situation regarding the organization’s consumer 
Trading Control 
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protection policy. In this situation, both states would benefit from supporting 
each other and compel the organization to be more lenient in both cases.  
 
The industrial organization of international bureaucracies 
Yet gains from exchange like this are difficult to realize. Enforcement 
problems arise because states do not realize their gains at the same time. 
Public perception of the issue may change, and the electoral effect of this 
change is observable only to the government it affects. This induces a form of 
moral hazard in that one party to the bargain may claim that it can no longer 
help control the international organization and so attempt to renege. In the 
face of this commitment problem, states can be expected to devise 
institutional arrangements that sustain exchanges of political support.  
The political economy literature on legislative institutions shows that this can 
be accomplished by assigning property rights over political jurisdictions. 
Consider the exchange of political support in the absence of property rights. 
State B announces that it supports state A’s demand that the bureaucracy 
enforce the liberalization of public companies less rigorously. In exchange for 
this support, state A announces its support for state B’s demand for a more 
generous consumer protection. After having adopted the consumer protection 
legislation, state B’s administration is replaced with a new government that in 
spite of its predecessor’s promise to support a more lenient policy demands 
that the international organization step up its effort to liberalize public 
companies. In other words, states face commitment problems due to their 
incentive to overturn the substance of a deal through subsequent political 
action.  
Mareike Kleine 
13   
 
Now consider the same bargain assuming that states have some influence on 
the international bureaucracy’s actions.6 State A builds a national chiefdom 
within the division responsible for the liberalization of public companies, and 
state B has some political clout in the division responsible for consumer 
protection. Suppose that, once state B has received support for more generous 
consumer protection, its new government demands that the international 
organization step up its effort to break up state-owned companies after all. To 
make the international organization toughen up the implementation of this 
policy, state B would have to order the international bureaucracy to pursue 
this more ambitious objective. Since the division responsible for the 
liberalization of public companies is part of state A’s chiefdom, however, state 
B is not in the position to change the international organization’s policy. In 
other words, the informal institutionalization of national spheres of influence 
within the international organization – that is, states’ control the design and 
selection of an aspect of the international organization’s agenda – serves as a 
mechanism to prevent ex post reneging (Weingast and Marshall 1988, 144). 
In short, gains from exchanges exist due to the fact that states place different 
values on the control of an international organization across various policy 
areas. Accordingly, different states seek to attain gate-keeping control in those 
policy areas that they prefer most. Therefore, states can be expected to 
establish spheres of influences over subdivisions that they intensely prefer. 
 
 
                                                        
6 The empirical literature on shows that there are several more or less subtle ways for states to 
do this, including domestic career rewards and punishments, recruitment requirements that bias 
staff toward a particular nationality or ideology, or the withholding of funds or expertise. 
Urpelainen ((2012)) gives a good overview of this literature. These instruments remain largely 
informal in order to prevent damage to the international organization’s and its members’ 
reputations. 
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Informal Spheres of Influence in the European Union 
The EU, like other international organizations, is based on several legalized 
interstate agreements that spell out the objectives and rules of cooperation. 
These agreements concerns first and foremost the establishment of a genuine 
single market, in which trade among the member states is as easy as trade 
within them. “Flanking” the single market are policies such as monetary 
union, competition, common commercial policy, environmental regulation, or 
consumer protection. Finally, the EU has more limited competences in 
security policy, immigration, police cooperation, and so on. This range of 
policies within the EU is considerably wider than that of the average 
international organization. 
This section looks at the European Commission’s composition in order to 
show that it exhibits informal spheres of influence that are controlled by 
individual member states with strong preferences in this subject area. It first 
contrasts the Commission’s formal set up with actual recruitment and 
decision-making practices. Against this backdrop, I evaluate the theory’s 
implication that preference outliers control these national chiefdoms – that is, 
that member states informally influence the agenda of divisions in which they 
hold intense preference.  
 
The European Commission as an independent agent 
At the EU’s core lies the following stylized decision-making process: The 
Commission, a supranational bureaucracy, is endowed with the exclusive 
right of legislative initiative. After the official submission of a legislative 
proposal, governments in the Council of Ministers may adopt, today jointly 
with the European Parliament, the legal act by majority vote, and they may 
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change it only when they are able to attain unanimity for an amendment. 
National administrations, the European Commission, or both, then typically 
implement the legal act. The European Court of Justice, in cooperation with 
domestic courts, enforces compliance with EU law. 
The European Commission is, therefore, the EU’s principal bureaucracy that 
helps the member states formulate and implement their legalized agreements. 
Its primary responsibilities include (1) proposing and developing policies and 
legislation; (2) executive functions, including secondary legislation and 
supervision of member state policy implementation; and (3) guarding the 
legal framework by monitoring compliance with EU law (Nugent 2010, 122-
133). 
Students of the EU usually explain the delegation of these powers to the 
Commission with the vocabulary of Principal-Agent theory (Pollack 2003). 
Since international cooperation generates benefits as well as adjustment costs 
for different domestic groups, governments might suddenly face incentives to 
give in to the demand of certain domestic interests to renege on an interstate 
agreement. To enhance the credibility of their commitment to cooperation, 
they consequently delegate the authority to formulate and implement their 
agreements to an agent that is shielded from these ad-hoc influences (Majone 
1994; Moravcsik 1998). Because they are more removed from domestic 
interests, so the logic of the argument, supranational institutions are more 
immune to ad-hoc influences than national administrations (Hawkins, Lake, 
Nielson et al. 2006, 18-19). 
Since the delegation of authority to the Commission is supposed to enhance 
the member states’ commitments, EU treaties put strong emphasis on this 
agent’s independence. The Treaty on European Union (Article 17) states: 
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In carrying out its responsibilities, the Commission shall be 
completely independent. [The] members of the Commission shall 
neither seek nor take instructions from any Government or other 
institution, body, office or entity. They shall refrain from any 
action incompatible with their duties or the performance of their 
tasks. 
Consequently, the treaties emphasize that the Commission’s internal decision-
making processes be shielded from ad-hoc influences. On top of the 
Commission’s administrative level, the services, is a political level composed 
of the President and a college of Commissioners, each of whom is nominated 
by a member states and responsible for a specific portfolio. The treaty 
stipulates that “[the] members of the Commission shall be chosen on the 
ground of their general competence and European commitment from persons 
whose independence is beyond doubt. (Article 17)” It goes on emphasizing 
that they “shall refrain from any action incompatible with their duties. 
Member States shall respect their independence and shall not seek to 
influence them in the performance of their tasks. (Article 245)” 
A number of control mechanisms are supposed to prevent the Commission 
from systematically overstepping its delegated discretion. For example, 
various governmental committees – the so-called “comitology” – monitor the 
implementation of policies by the Commission. In addition, other 
supranational institutions such as the European Parliament and the Court of 
Auditors monitor the Commission’s behavior. The European Court of Justice 
reviews the legality of its actions, which it may declare void, and may also 
rule on the Commission’s failure to act on its responsibilities under the 
treaties (Pollack 1997, 114-116). 
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The Commission in reality 
The EU’s formal rules suggest a principal-agent relationship between the 
member states and the Commission. The member states deliberately 
delegated the authority to implement their legalized agreements to this 
supranational bureaucracy. Fully aware of their temptation to manipulate 
their agent, they officially pledged to guarantee its complete independence 
from national and other ad-hoc influences. A number of external control 
mechanisms hinder the Commission from overstepping its discretion. 
In practice, however, the Commission was never able to assert its 
independence in full. I now contrast its official set-up with the practices that 
developed in reality in order to show how informal spheres of national 
influence developed inside the Commission. Immediately after the 
Commission had been set up in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the 
Commissioners established personal offices, the original function of which 
was to prepare decisions in the college of Commissioners (Krenzler 1974). But 
these offices, the cabinets, quickly assumed additional tasks. Composed 
mainly of fellow countrymen, they served as a transmission belt between the 
Commissioner and her home country, and the member states themselves did 
not shy away from using these ties to raise objections against legislative 
proposals in the making. For example, in an internal meeting of 
undersecretaries in the late 1960s, the German economics ministry observed 
that other countries made much better use of “their” Commissioners, and 
urged that it was necessary to follow suit in order to be able to voice specific 
concerns about Commission initiatives (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft 
1967). The cabinets permitted the Commissioner, to whom they were directly 
responsible, to intervene in the work of the Commission services (Coombes 
1970, 255). Describing the development of “national enclaves” within the 
Commission, a close observer observes in 1964 a strong “discrepancy between 
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institutional theory of the Communities… and the administrative practice of 
the Commission (Siotis 1964, 249). 
Fearing this degradation of the Commission’s supranational character and the 
collaboration between college and civil servants, its first president Walter 
Hallstein was keen to keep the cabinets’ size as small as possible. A member of 
the Hallstein Commission  (Lemaignen 1964, 49-50) explains: 
The President [Hallstein] was categorically opposed to the 
numerous cabinets: he said he did not want the Commissioners 
to become “mediatized” by their immediate collaborators. 
Beyond doubt, he also considered that because everyone 
seemed to quietly agree that cabinet members ought to be of the 
same nationality as the Commissioner, their excessive 
multiplication risked creating an internal nationalism within the 
cabinet. 
Nevertheless, the Commissioners found various ways to work around the 
president’s order. The size and influence of the cabinets consequently grew 
considerably toward the end of the decade (Bitsch 2007, 200; Ritchie 1992, 
104). Thus, when the college decided in the early 1970s to restrict the number 
of cabinet members, the Commissioners did not adhere to their own rule 
(Endo 1999, 44). The cabinets grew dramatically from an average of four in 
the late 1960s to fourteen members by the mid-1970s (Michelmann 1978, 495; 
Poullet and Deprez 1976, 53), and increasingly became a channel for the 
member states to raise objections against proposals in the making, and for the 
Commissioners to subsequently intervene in the work of the services  
(European Communities 1979, 56).  
Although the Presidency of Jacques Delors from 1985 until 1995 is often 
hailed as the second heyday of the Commission, these years only served to 
enhance the power of the cabinets and intensify frictions between the college 
and the services. For Delors, his personal office was a means to do an end-run 
around slow internal decision-making, and the members of his cabinet, 
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headed by Pascal Lamy, were considered particularly patronizing, even 
brutal, towards other Commissioners and the Commission services (Ross 
1994, 63-68). Other Commissioners seized the opportunity by strengthening 
their own cabinets’ power over the services. An internal report in 1991 notes 
an ever-increasing interference by cabinets into the work and tasks that are 
incumbent on the services (Commission des Communautés Européennes 
1991, 4). Another internal report (Commission Européenne 1994, 36) about the 
Commission’s efficiency drawn up by the services points to the cabinets’ 
increasing meddling with the Directorate Generals’ work, and demands 
… first of all, to improve the connection [embrayage] between 
the institution’s political and the administrative level, and in 
this context to limit the excessive interference of the member 
states. 
The system of cabinets came under fire when various incidents of 
mismanagement and nepotism under Delors’ and, subsequently, Jacques 
Santer’s Presidencies put the Commission under increased public scrutiny 
(Commission Européenne 1994, chap 2; European Commission 1998). The 
Commission’s services set up a task force and the European Parliament a 
Committee of Independent Experts to inquire into the cause of the 
Commission’s mismanagement. The report criticized that cabinets are 
“composed exclusively or predominantly of persons of the same nationality 
as the commissioner” and consequently demanded clearer rules and criteria 
for the appointment of individuals to the cabinets as well as limits on the 
cabinets’ size and quotas to ensure their multinational character (Committee 
of Independent Experts 1999, 23). A former member of one of these cabinets 
(Eppink 2007, 115-116, 119) describes their role as gate-keepers and 
transmission belts. 
[A] member of cabinet has to be a kind of internal spy. To do this 
job, he has to know what is going on in the DG – and this is not 
always straightforward… As soon as a draft reaches the political 
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level – in other words, the level of cabinets – national interests 
come more strongly into play. During my studies, I had been 
taught that a Commissioner works for the greater good of all 
Europeans. Like many things taught at school, this is not entirely 
true… [All] too often national reoccupations are introduced into 
the debate via the backdoor of the Commissioner’s cabinet. 
There have been a number of attempts to reform the cabinet system. Under 
Commission President Romano Prodi each cabinet was supposed to include 
staff of at least three nationalities comprising no more than six senior 
members (Agence Europe 1999; Prodi 1999). His successor Barroso decreed 
that at least three members had to be recruited from the services (Peterson 
2010, 5). Although the cabinets became more multinational at the core 
(Egeberg and Heskestad 2010, 780), the actual effects of these changes are 
mixed. Commissioners once again found various ways around the rules. 
Peterson (2010, note 2) notes that there is currently considerable ambiguity 
with respect to the role of personal advisors, who are not official members of 
the cabinet. Although the number of cabinet members has gone down 
officially, the Commissioners clearly get additional personal help. “By a 
liberal account,” he notes, “most cabinets could be viewed as having at least 
17 members.”  
Thus, the qualitative data about actual decision-making practices within the 
Commission strongly suggest the existence of national spheres of influence 
within the Commission. Statistical evidence confirms this finding. In an 
analysis of 70 legislative proposal introduced by the Commission between 
1996 and 2000, Robert Thomson (2008, 187) finds that the nationality of the 
responsible Commissioner has a substantial effect on the Commission’s 
position vis-à-vis the member states. In other words, it shifts the 
Commission’s position closer to that of the Commissioner’s home country 
and farther away from other member states’ positions. This findings suggest 
that, once appointed, Commissioners are not entirely insulated from national 
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pressures and, in fact, build national chiefdoms to control their subdivision’s 
policy.  
 
The distribution of posts in the Commission 
Why do member states tolerate national spheres of influence within the 
Commission? Why don’t they abolish the member states’ representation 
within the Commission, or design it in ways that its officials can fight off the 
member states’ interference into their work? I argue that the member states’ 
realize gains from exchange of political support by granting one another 
agenda control over the organization’s individual subdivisions. This implies 
that preference outlier instead of median countries control national chiefdoms 
within the Commission. 
Arndt Wonka’s extensive empirical study of the appointment of 
Commissioners since 1958 shows that the member states strategically secure 
portfolios that they intensely prefer for Commissioners of their nationality.7 
Focusing on party preference, he finds that member states that are governed 
by a left-wing party at the time of appointment predominantly occupy 
subdivisions, Directorate Generals, that deal with the negative externalities of 
the single market, namely consumer protection, environment, social policy, 
and so on, whereas conservative parties strongly dominate the Commission’s 
Directorate General responsible for Agriculture. Similar patterns exist at the 
                                                        
7 Until 1993, the Council had to agree unanimously on the entire college including its president. 
Appointments of new Commissions were consequently preceded by intense negotiations among 
the member states about the prospective president as well as the distribution of posts and 
portfolios. The Maastricht Treaty gave the European Parliament and the prospective Commission 
president a formal say in the appointment procedure. Today, the member states first appoint the 
president of the Commission before all of them draw up a list of candidates for the post of 
Commissioners. Both Parliament and the Commission president have the power to veto this list. 
These changes to the appointment procedure notwithstanding, the member states have retained 
considerable power the member states jointly set the agenda by proposing a composition of the 
college that they, the Parliament, and all actors eventually vote upon ((Wonka 2007, 170-173)). 
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member state level. To give but a few examples: countries such as Germany 
and Great Britain that are “net contributors” strongly dominate the 
Directorate General responsible for the Budget in order to prevent lavish 
spending. Countries that share a border with membership candidates have 
always occupied the division responsible for EU enlargement (Wonka 2008, 
121-130). Accordingly, it became evident very early on that some Directorate 
Generals more or less “belonged” to certain member states (Cini 1996, 126). 
One might object that national chiefdoms exist because officials from 
countries with a special interest in a specific policy have more expertise in this 
area (Krehbiel 1991). Thus, officials from land-locked Austria simply lack 
substantive knowledge about the intricacies of deep-sea fisheries. Although 
both explanations need not be mutually exclusive, the evidence does not 
sustain this objection. If expertise were the main selection criterion, member 
states would appoint Commissioners with previous experience in the subject 
matter. Wonka (2007, 178-9) finds, however, that the member states prefer 
people with a visible political career to technocrats with a reputation for 
substantive expertise. In fact, they primarily appoint Commissioners who 
share the party affiliation of the government in office. The reason, he 
maintains, is for the member states to avoid the imposition of materially and 
politically costly EU regulations.  
Summing up, the evidence presented in this section suggests that member 
states grant one another spheres of influence within the European 
Commission. As demonstrated with the description of the cabinet system, 
these national chiefdoms hold agenda-setting power over the Commission’s 
Directorate Generals, and the member states do not shy away from using this 
influence for their purposes. Corroborating the theory, I found that 
Commissioners tend to head national chiefdoms in policy areas in which their 
home country holds intense preferences. 
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Discussion: National Chiefdoms Outside the EU 
One might object that this case selection overestimates the theory’s 
plausibility, since the EU’s broad scope with policies ranging from consumer 
protection over agriculture to monetary union and a common security policy 
offers plenty opportunities for exchange. Quite possibly international 
organizations with narrower scope, everything else being equal, are less likely 
to exhibit national spheres of influence. It can also be argued that the EU is a 
hard case for the theory. Headed by influential presidents, allied with other 
supranational actors, and partly drawing on own resources, the Commission 
is more autonomous and, therefore, better able to fight off national influences 
than many other international administrations. Accordingly, tacit deals 
among governments in terms of controlling different aspects of an 
international organization’s output are not limited to the EU. 
However, a cursory look at appointments and recruitment in international 
organization illustrates the theory’s plausibility in other contexts. The most 
prominent example of tacit trades of control is perhaps the understanding 
between the US and the EU that a European national chair the IMF, whereas 
an American citizen heads the World Bank. There are other, more subtle 
examples.  
Consider the United Nations. The Secretariat, staffed by international civil 
servants, carries out a myriad of duties ranging from the administration of 
peacekeeping operations to making studies about different countries’ 
economic and social trends. According to the Charter, the secretariat is 
entirely independent and, to avoid any national clustering, recruited on a 
wide geographical basis (Jonah 2008, 166). In reality, there is “a continuing 
disparity between the formal or legal code of conduct and the operational 
code” (Meron 1981, 910). Recruitment of senior staff is guided by an informal 
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agreement among the permanent members of the Security Council that 
emerged in the midst of the Cold War when the they agreed “to ask” that a 
national of each be appointed as Assistant Secretary-General. The other four 
members, France, Britain, the United States and China, also staked their 
respective claims to a position at the highest administrative level (Ziring, 
Riggs, and Plano 2000, 117-118). Nationals of the same country or a certain 
group of countries usually inherit these posts (Meron 1981-1982, 862). As the 
number of top Secretariat positions (Under- and Assistant Secretaries-
General) increased, the practices of preserving such appointments was 
extended to other governments, leading to what a close observer called 
“national monopolies on senior posts” that resulted in a “fiefdom mentality” 
(Rivlin 1993, 9) and “national preserves” (Meron 1977, 93-98) over certain top-
level posts in the Secretariat. As two close observer note 
[Under- and Assistant Secretaries-General] posts have become 
associated with certain nationalities, or regional or language 
groups, and although there may be “trades” affecting which 
nationality or group is represented in which post, the overall 
balance within the upper levels is likely to change only slowly 
(Finger and Mugno, in (Ameri 1996, 250). 
Interestingly, there is variation in the prevalence of informal spheres of 
national influence. In fact, other international organizations such as the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) appear to have developed implicit norms against 
the trading of control of its secretariats’ divisions. The WTO rests on 
agreements that cover, among other things, market access, subsidies, anti-
dumping, agriculture, intellectual property rights, trade and environment, 
and technical trade barriers. Its Secretariat, which comprises sixteen 
subdivisions that are supposed to engage in helping the members to monitor 
compliance with the existing agreements, is supposed to be the guardian of 
the treaties and to assist and support WTO members within the framework of 
this mission. Article VI of the agreement establishing the WTO stipulates that 
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it does not “seek or accept instructions from any government or any other 
authority external to the WTO…”  
The lack of specific appointment procedure and official national quotas that 
constrain recruitment for posts within the WTO secretariat should facilitate 
the trading of control through national chiefdoms. Indeed, there is more 
sensitivity for an appropriate regional balance at the top level as well as an 
understanding that the US and the EU as the two most influential members 
will always have one Deputy Director-General. However, there is little 
evidence that the member states grant one another influence over divisions 
that lie close to their heart. On the contrary, two close observers of the WTO 
note “a tacit agreement that no one chairs a committee on a subject on which 
his country has strong interests; thus Australia and Switzerland would not 
want, or be asked, to chair a committee on agriculture” (Yi-chon and Weller 
2004, 257-259). 
This cursory discussion of official and informal appointment procedures in 
important international organizations illustrates that the phenomenon of 
informal spheres of influences within international organizations is not 
limited to the EU. Importantly, some international organizations exhibit more 
national chiefdoms than others. The conclusion discusses why this might be 
the case.  
 
Conclusion 
The last decade has witnessed an increasing popularity of Principal-Agent 
approaches to international organizations. In this view, states (the principal) 
delegate the implementation of a legalized agreement to an international 
organization (the agent). The conventional wisdom about states’ capacity to 
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control international organizations is that differences among the member 
states impede control and consequently enhance the agent’s autonomy, 
whereas agreement allows for effective control and limited autonomy. 
Contrary to this conventional wisdom, this article argues that conflicts among 
states need not impede effective control. On the contrary: it harbors gains 
from the exchange of control over an organization. To reap these gains, states 
grant one another agenda control over their organization’s most preferred 
subdivisions. As a result, international organizations exhibit informal spheres 
of influence, or national chiefdoms. The article demonstrated the theory’s 
plausibility using the example of the EU. However, the cursory review of 
appointments and recruitment in other international organization 
demonstrates that this phenomenon is by no means limited to the European 
case, and that there is variation in the extent that international organization 
exhibit national chiefdoms. 
What explains an international organization’s propensity to develop national 
chiefdoms within it? One possibility is, as mentioned above, that the 
multidimensionality of an organization in relation to the diversity of interests 
among member states determines the existence of national chiefdoms. A 
broader scope and fewer cleavages among states (as in the EU) provide more 
opportunities for the exchange control within an international organization, 
whereas a relatively narrower scope and more cleavages among the members 
(as in the WTO) offer fewer opportunities. Another, simpler reason could be 
that the WTO secretariat has far less discretion over policies than the 
European Commission. In this sense, states gain from exchanging control only 
when there is anything to control to begin with. 
The theory has important implications for our understanding of international 
organizations. First, it cautions against approaching, as Principal-Agent 
theory typically does, international organizations as unitary actors with a 
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uniform preference for autonomy. If states seize opportunities for trading 
informal control over the organization’s division, these are, in fact, empirical 
questions that cannot be imputed to an international organization. 
Second, and related, the theory suggests that states have more informal 
control over international organizations than their formal rules and anecdotes 
about runaway international bureaucracies have us believe. This does not 
mean that national chiefdoms impede cooperation. Rather, informal influence 
allows countries to curb and push a division’s activism, or to influence the 
content of its policy. 
Third, where prominent theories of informal governance attribute informal 
national influences on an international organization to power asymmetry 
among member states, this article presents a transaction cost-based argument 
for the existence of this phenomenon. Yet both arguments need not be 
mutually exclusive. Since the number and value of the “goods” (i.e. divisions) 
to be distributed might be scarce, states will bargain and fight over the precise 
distribution of national chiefdoms among them. In this fight, powerful states 
can be expected to get the first pick and occupy more divisions than their 
weaker cooperating partners. 
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